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Willemijn Kornelius, Prior filtering obligations after Case C-401/19: balancing the content moderation triangle A comparative analysis of the legal implications of Case C-401/19 for filtering obligations ex ante and the freedom of expression in Europe, 14 (2023) JIPITEC 123 para 1.
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%0 Journal Article %T Prior filtering obligations after Case C-401/19: balancing the content moderation triangle A comparative analysis of the legal implications of Case C-401/19 for filtering obligations ex ante and the freedom of expression in Europe %A Kornelius, Willemijn %J JIPITEC %D 2023 %V 14 %N 1 %@ 2190-3387 %F kornelius2023 %X On 26 April 2022, the CJEU finally delivered its judgment (Case C-401/19 Poland v. Parliament and Council) on the compatibility of Article 17 DSM-directive with the freedom of expression (Article 11 Charter). Article 17 DSM-directive introduces an obligation for online content-sharing platforms to proactively prevent uploads of copyright infringing material. This de facto requires them to resort to automatic filtering technologies with a potential of over-blocking. The CJEU concluded that such prior filtering restricts an important means of disseminating online content and therefore constitutes a limitation of Article 11 of the EU Charter. The CJEU nevertheless upheld Article 17, finding a justification for this limitation. Several scholars have suggested that the CJEU’s conclusions have implications outside the copyright realm on obligations for platforms to detect illegal content. Although this linkage is suggested, it has up to now not been looked into exhaustively. This article aims to answer the question what the legal implications of Case C-401/19 are for the regime of de facto obligations on online content-sharing platforms under EU law to act against illegal content ex ante more generally. It distils other de facto obligations on online content-sharing platforms to carry out a prior review of content. These obligations are all governed by the prohibition of general monitoring obligations (e.g. Article 8 DSA). The CJEU treats this prohibition as a safeguard to the freedom of expression. Consequently, online content-sharing platforms should only block content that is clearly illegal. This article shows that the fundamental importance of the freedom of expression and information of the users of the internet needs to play a key role in designing obligations to act against illegal content both inside and outside the area of copyright law. %L 340 %K content moderation %K freedom of expression %K general monitoring obligation %K illegal content %K online platforms %U http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-57125 %P 123-NoneDownload
Bibtex
@Article{kornelius2023,
author = "Kornelius, Willemijn",
title = "Prior filtering obligations after Case C-401/19: balancing the content moderation triangle A comparative analysis of the legal implications of Case C-401/19 for filtering obligations ex ante and the freedom of expression in Europe",
journal = "JIPITEC",
year = "2023",
volume = "14",
number = "1",
pages = "123--None",
keywords = "content moderation; freedom of expression; general monitoring obligation; illegal content; online platforms",
abstract = "On 26 April 2022, the CJEU finally delivered its judgment (Case C-401/19 Poland v. Parliament and Council) on the compatibility of Article 17 DSM-directive with the freedom of expression (Article 11 Charter). Article 17 DSM-directive introduces an obligation for online content-sharing platforms to proactively prevent uploads of copyright infringing material. This de facto requires them to resort to automatic filtering technologies with a potential of over-blocking. The CJEU concluded that such prior filtering restricts an important means of disseminating online content and therefore constitutes a limitation of Article 11 of the EU Charter. The CJEU nevertheless upheld Article 17, finding a justification for this limitation. Several scholars have suggested that the CJEU's conclusions have implications outside the copyright realm on obligations for platforms to detect illegal content. Although this linkage is suggested, it has up to now not been looked into exhaustively. This article aims to answer the question what the legal implications of Case C-401/19 are for the regime of de facto obligations on online content-sharing platforms under EU law to act against illegal content ex ante more generally. It distils other de facto obligations on online content-sharing platforms to carry out a prior review of content. These obligations are all governed by the prohibition of general monitoring obligations (e.g. Article 8 DSA). The CJEU treats this prohibition as a safeguard to the freedom of expression. Consequently, online content-sharing platforms should only block content that is clearly illegal. This article shows that the fundamental importance of the freedom of expression and information of the users of the internet needs to play a key role in designing obligations to act against illegal content both inside and outside the area of copyright law.",
issn = "2190-3387",
url = "http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-57125"
}
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TY - JOUR AU - Kornelius, Willemijn PY - 2023 DA - 2023// TI - Prior filtering obligations after Case C-401/19: balancing the content moderation triangle A comparative analysis of the legal implications of Case C-401/19 for filtering obligations ex ante and the freedom of expression in Europe JO - JIPITEC SP - 123 EP - None VL - 14 IS - 1 KW - content moderation KW - freedom of expression KW - general monitoring obligation KW - illegal content KW - online platforms AB - On 26 April 2022, the CJEU finally delivered its judgment (Case C-401/19 Poland v. Parliament and Council) on the compatibility of Article 17 DSM-directive with the freedom of expression (Article 11 Charter). Article 17 DSM-directive introduces an obligation for online content-sharing platforms to proactively prevent uploads of copyright infringing material. This de facto requires them to resort to automatic filtering technologies with a potential of over-blocking. The CJEU concluded that such prior filtering restricts an important means of disseminating online content and therefore constitutes a limitation of Article 11 of the EU Charter. The CJEU nevertheless upheld Article 17, finding a justification for this limitation. Several scholars have suggested that the CJEU’s conclusions have implications outside the copyright realm on obligations for platforms to detect illegal content. Although this linkage is suggested, it has up to now not been looked into exhaustively. This article aims to answer the question what the legal implications of Case C-401/19 are for the regime of de facto obligations on online content-sharing platforms under EU law to act against illegal content ex ante more generally. It distils other de facto obligations on online content-sharing platforms to carry out a prior review of content. These obligations are all governed by the prohibition of general monitoring obligations (e.g. Article 8 DSA). The CJEU treats this prohibition as a safeguard to the freedom of expression. Consequently, online content-sharing platforms should only block content that is clearly illegal. This article shows that the fundamental importance of the freedom of expression and information of the users of the internet needs to play a key role in designing obligations to act against illegal content both inside and outside the area of copyright law. SN - 2190-3387 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-57125 ID - kornelius2023 ER -Download
Wordbib
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ISI
PT Journal AU Kornelius, W TI Prior filtering obligations after Case C-401/19: balancing the content moderation triangle A comparative analysis of the legal implications of Case C-401/19 for filtering obligations ex ante and the freedom of expression in Europe SO JIPITEC PY 2023 BP 123 EP None VL 14 IS 1 DE content moderation; freedom of expression; general monitoring obligation; illegal content; online platforms AB On 26 April 2022, the CJEU finally delivered its judgment (Case C-401/19 Poland v. Parliament and Council) on the compatibility of Article 17 DSM-directive with the freedom of expression (Article 11 Charter). Article 17 DSM-directive introduces an obligation for online content-sharing platforms to proactively prevent uploads of copyright infringing material. This de facto requires them to resort to automatic filtering technologies with a potential of over-blocking. The CJEU concluded that such prior filtering restricts an important means of disseminating online content and therefore constitutes a limitation of Article 11 of the EU Charter. The CJEU nevertheless upheld Article 17, finding a justification for this limitation. Several scholars have suggested that the CJEU’s conclusions have implications outside the copyright realm on obligations for platforms to detect illegal content. Although this linkage is suggested, it has up to now not been looked into exhaustively. This article aims to answer the question what the legal implications of Case C-401/19 are for the regime of de facto obligations on online content-sharing platforms under EU law to act against illegal content ex ante more generally. It distils other de facto obligations on online content-sharing platforms to carry out a prior review of content. These obligations are all governed by the prohibition of general monitoring obligations (e.g. Article 8 DSA). The CJEU treats this prohibition as a safeguard to the freedom of expression. Consequently, online content-sharing platforms should only block content that is clearly illegal. This article shows that the fundamental importance of the freedom of expression and information of the users of the internet needs to play a key role in designing obligations to act against illegal content both inside and outside the area of copyright law. ERDownload
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<abstract>On 26 April 2022, the CJEU finally delivered its judgment (Case C-401/19 Poland v. Parliament and Council) on the compatibility of Article 17 DSM-directive with the freedom of expression (Article 11 Charter). Article 17 DSM-directive introduces an obligation for online content-sharing platforms to proactively prevent uploads of copyright infringing material. This de facto requires them to resort to automatic filtering technologies with a potential of over-blocking. The CJEU concluded that such prior filtering restricts an important means of disseminating online content and therefore constitutes a limitation of Article 11 of the EU Charter. The CJEU nevertheless upheld Article 17, finding a justification for this limitation. Several scholars have suggested that the CJEU’s conclusions have implications outside the copyright realm on obligations for platforms to detect illegal content. Although this linkage is suggested, it has up to now not been looked into exhaustively. This article aims to answer the question what the legal implications of Case C-401/19 are for the regime of de facto obligations on online content-sharing platforms under EU law to act against illegal content ex ante more generally. It distils other de facto obligations on online content-sharing platforms to carry out a prior review of content. These obligations are all governed by the prohibition of general monitoring obligations (e.g. Article 8 DSA). The CJEU treats this prohibition as a safeguard to the freedom of expression. Consequently, online content-sharing platforms should only block content that is clearly illegal. This article shows that the fundamental importance of the freedom of expression and information of the users of the internet needs to play a key role in designing obligations to act against illegal content both inside and outside the area of copyright law.</abstract>
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Full Metadata
| Bibliographic Citation | Journal of intellectual property, information technology and electronic commerce law 14 (2023) 1 |
|---|---|
| Title |
Prior filtering obligations after Case C-401/19: balancing the content moderation triangle A comparative analysis of the legal implications of Case C-401/19 for filtering obligations ex ante and the freedom of expression in Europe (eng) |
| Author | Willemijn Kornelius |
| Language | eng |
| Abstract | On 26 April 2022, the CJEU finally delivered its judgment (Case C-401/19 Poland v. Parliament and Council) on the compatibility of Article 17 DSM-directive with the freedom of expression (Article 11 Charter). Article 17 DSM-directive introduces an obligation for online content-sharing platforms to proactively prevent uploads of copyright infringing material. This de facto requires them to resort to automatic filtering technologies with a potential of over-blocking. The CJEU concluded that such prior filtering restricts an important means of disseminating online content and therefore constitutes a limitation of Article 11 of the EU Charter. The CJEU nevertheless upheld Article 17, finding a justification for this limitation. Several scholars have suggested that the CJEU’s conclusions have implications outside the copyright realm on obligations for platforms to detect illegal content. Although this linkage is suggested, it has up to now not been looked into exhaustively. This article aims to answer the question what the legal implications of Case C-401/19 are for the regime of de facto obligations on online content-sharing platforms under EU law to act against illegal content ex ante more generally. It distils other de facto obligations on online content-sharing platforms to carry out a prior review of content. These obligations are all governed by the prohibition of general monitoring obligations (e.g. Article 8 DSA). The CJEU treats this prohibition as a safeguard to the freedom of expression. Consequently, online content-sharing platforms should only block content that is clearly illegal. This article shows that the fundamental importance of the freedom of expression and information of the users of the internet needs to play a key role in designing obligations to act against illegal content both inside and outside the area of copyright law. |
| Subject | content moderation, freedom of expression, general monitoring obligation, illegal content, online platforms |
| DDC | 340 |
| Rights | DPPL |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:0009-29-57125 |
