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Yoan Hermstrüwer, Contracting Around Privacy: The (Behavioral) Law and Economics of Consent and Big Data, 8 (2017) JIPITEC 9 para 1.
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%0 Journal Article %T Contracting Around Privacy: The (Behavioral) Law and Economics of Consent and Big Data %A Hermstrüwer, Yoan %J JIPITEC %D 2017 %V 8 %N 1 %@ 2190-3387 %F hermstrüwer2017 %X European privacy law rests on the implicit assumption that consent to the processing of personal data and the analysis of Big Data is a purely individual choice. Accordingly, privacy lawyers mainly focus on how to empower users to make free and informed choices, for instance through debiasing and nudging. However, a game theoretical analysis suggests that strategic considerations may be a driving force of consent under certain conditions. In environments relying on the use of Big Data, consent is likely to impose negative privacy externalities on other users and constrain their freedom of choice. By contrast, a behavioral economic analysis suggests that users are subject to bounded rationality and bounded willpower. While nudges, like default options, can enable users to make protective privacy choices in some cases, correcting cognitive deficits might facilitate market failures and accelerate the erosion of privacy in other cases. This counterintuitive conclusion shows that legal rules on consent and privacy contracts should be grounded on an assumption of ‘mixed rationalities’, i.e. on insights from both standard economics and behavioral economics. Hence, a sharper distinction between ‘paternalistic nudging’ and ‘non-paternalistic soft regulation’ to counter market failures is warranted. %L 340 %K Consent %K EU privacy law %K EU-GDPR %K behavioral law and economics %K big data %K constitutional law %K game theory %K libertarian paternalism %K monetizing personal data %K nudging %U http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-45293 %P 9-26Download
Bibtex
@Article{hermstrüwer2017,
author = "Hermstr{\"u}wer, Yoan",
title = "Contracting Around Privacy: The (Behavioral) Law and Economics of Consent and Big Data",
journal = "JIPITEC",
year = "2017",
volume = "8",
number = "1",
pages = "9--26",
keywords = "Consent; EU privacy law; EU-GDPR; behavioral law and economics; big data; constitutional law; game theory; libertarian paternalism; monetizing personal data; nudging",
abstract = "European privacy law rests on the implicit assumption that consent to the processing of personal data and the analysis of Big Data is a purely individual choice. Accordingly, privacy lawyers mainly focus on how to empower users to make free and informed choices, for instance through debiasing and nudging. However, a game theoretical analysis suggests that strategic considerations may be a driving force of consent under certain conditions. In environments relying on the use of Big Data, consent is likely to impose negative privacy externalities on other users and constrain their freedom of choice. By contrast, a behavioral economic analysis suggests that users are subject to bounded rationality and bounded willpower. While nudges, like default options, can enable users to make protective privacy choices in some cases, correcting cognitive deficits might facilitate market failures and accelerate the erosion of privacy in other cases. This counterintuitive conclusion shows that legal rules on consent and privacy contracts should be grounded on an assumption of `mixed rationalities', i.e. on insights from both standard economics and behavioral economics. Hence, a sharper distinction between `paternalistic nudging' and `non-paternalistic soft regulation' to counter market failures is warranted.",
issn = "2190-3387",
url = "http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-45293"
}
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TY - JOUR AU - Hermstrüwer, Yoan PY - 2017 DA - 2017// TI - Contracting Around Privacy: The (Behavioral) Law and Economics of Consent and Big Data JO - JIPITEC SP - 9 EP - 26 VL - 8 IS - 1 KW - Consent KW - EU privacy law KW - EU-GDPR KW - behavioral law and economics KW - big data KW - constitutional law KW - game theory KW - libertarian paternalism KW - monetizing personal data KW - nudging AB - European privacy law rests on the implicit assumption that consent to the processing of personal data and the analysis of Big Data is a purely individual choice. Accordingly, privacy lawyers mainly focus on how to empower users to make free and informed choices, for instance through debiasing and nudging. However, a game theoretical analysis suggests that strategic considerations may be a driving force of consent under certain conditions. In environments relying on the use of Big Data, consent is likely to impose negative privacy externalities on other users and constrain their freedom of choice. By contrast, a behavioral economic analysis suggests that users are subject to bounded rationality and bounded willpower. While nudges, like default options, can enable users to make protective privacy choices in some cases, correcting cognitive deficits might facilitate market failures and accelerate the erosion of privacy in other cases. This counterintuitive conclusion shows that legal rules on consent and privacy contracts should be grounded on an assumption of ‘mixed rationalities’, i.e. on insights from both standard economics and behavioral economics. Hence, a sharper distinction between ‘paternalistic nudging’ and ‘non-paternalistic soft regulation’ to counter market failures is warranted. SN - 2190-3387 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-45293 ID - hermstrüwer2017 ER -Download
Wordbib
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <b:Sources SelectedStyle="" xmlns:b="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography" xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography" > <b:Source> <b:Tag>hermstrüwer2017</b:Tag> <b:SourceType>ArticleInAPeriodical</b:SourceType> <b:Year>2017</b:Year> <b:PeriodicalTitle>JIPITEC</b:PeriodicalTitle> <b:Volume>8</b:Volume> <b:Issue>1</b:Issue> <b:Url>http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-45293</b:Url> <b:Pages>9-26</b:Pages> <b:Author> <b:Author><b:NameList> <b:Person><b:Last>Hermstrüwer</b:Last><b:First>Yoan</b:First></b:Person> </b:NameList></b:Author> </b:Author> <b:Title>Contracting Around Privacy: The (Behavioral) Law and Economics of Consent and Big Data</b:Title> <b:Comments>European privacy law rests on the implicit assumption that consent to the processing of personal data and the analysis of Big Data is a purely individual choice. Accordingly, privacy lawyers mainly focus on how to empower users to make free and informed choices, for instance through debiasing and nudging. However, a game theoretical analysis suggests that strategic considerations may be a driving force of consent under certain conditions. In environments relying on the use of Big Data, consent is likely to impose negative privacy externalities on other users and constrain their freedom of choice. By contrast, a behavioral economic analysis suggests that users are subject to bounded rationality and bounded willpower. While nudges, like default options, can enable users to make protective privacy choices in some cases, correcting cognitive deficits might facilitate market failures and accelerate the erosion of privacy in other cases. This counterintuitive conclusion shows that legal rules on consent and privacy contracts should be grounded on an assumption of ‘mixed rationalities’, i.e. on insights from both standard economics and behavioral economics. Hence, a sharper distinction between ‘paternalistic nudging’ and ‘non-paternalistic soft regulation’ to counter market failures is warranted.</b:Comments> </b:Source> </b:Sources>Download
ISI
PT Journal AU Hermstrüwer, Y TI Contracting Around Privacy: The (Behavioral) Law and Economics of Consent and Big Data SO JIPITEC PY 2017 BP 9 EP 26 VL 8 IS 1 DE Consent; EU privacy law; EU-GDPR; behavioral law and economics; big data; constitutional law; game theory; libertarian paternalism; monetizing personal data; nudging AB European privacy law rests on the implicit assumption that consent to the processing of personal data and the analysis of Big Data is a purely individual choice. Accordingly, privacy lawyers mainly focus on how to empower users to make free and informed choices, for instance through debiasing and nudging. However, a game theoretical analysis suggests that strategic considerations may be a driving force of consent under certain conditions. In environments relying on the use of Big Data, consent is likely to impose negative privacy externalities on other users and constrain their freedom of choice. By contrast, a behavioral economic analysis suggests that users are subject to bounded rationality and bounded willpower. While nudges, like default options, can enable users to make protective privacy choices in some cases, correcting cognitive deficits might facilitate market failures and accelerate the erosion of privacy in other cases. This counterintuitive conclusion shows that legal rules on consent and privacy contracts should be grounded on an assumption of ‘mixed rationalities’, i.e. on insights from both standard economics and behavioral economics. Hence, a sharper distinction between ‘paternalistic nudging’ and ‘non-paternalistic soft regulation’ to counter market failures is warranted. ERDownload
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<abstract>European privacy law rests on the implicit assumption that consent to the processing of personal data and the analysis of Big Data is a purely individual choice. Accordingly, privacy lawyers mainly focus on how to empower users to make free and informed choices, for instance through debiasing and nudging. However, a game theoretical analysis suggests that strategic considerations may be a driving force of consent under certain conditions. In environments relying on the use of Big Data, consent is likely to impose negative privacy externalities on other users and constrain their freedom of choice. By contrast, a behavioral economic analysis suggests that users are subject to bounded rationality and bounded willpower. While nudges, like default options, can enable users to make protective privacy choices in some cases, correcting cognitive deficits might facilitate market failures and accelerate the erosion of privacy in other cases. This counterintuitive conclusion shows that legal rules on consent and privacy contracts should be grounded on an assumption of ‘mixed rationalities’, i.e. on insights from both standard economics and behavioral economics. Hence, a sharper distinction between ‘paternalistic nudging’ and ‘non-paternalistic soft regulation’ to counter market failures is warranted.</abstract>
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Full Metadata
| Bibliographic Citation | Journal of intellectual property, information technology and electronic commerce law 8 (2017) 1 |
|---|---|
| Title |
Contracting Around Privacy: The (Behavioral) Law and Economics of Consent and Big Data (eng) |
| Author | Yoan Hermstrüwer |
| Language | eng |
| Abstract | European privacy law rests on the implicit assumption that consent to the processing of personal data and the analysis of Big Data is a purely individual choice. Accordingly, privacy lawyers mainly focus on how to empower users to make free and informed choices, for instance through debiasing and nudging. However, a game theoretical analysis suggests that strategic considerations may be a driving force of consent under certain conditions. In environments relying on the use of Big Data, consent is likely to impose negative privacy externalities on other users and constrain their freedom of choice. By contrast, a behavioral economic analysis suggests that users are subject to bounded rationality and bounded willpower. While nudges, like default options, can enable users to make protective privacy choices in some cases, correcting cognitive deficits might facilitate market failures and accelerate the erosion of privacy in other cases. This counterintuitive conclusion shows that legal rules on consent and privacy contracts should be grounded on an assumption of ‘mixed rationalities’, i.e. on insights from both standard economics and behavioral economics. Hence, a sharper distinction between ‘paternalistic nudging’ and ‘non-paternalistic soft regulation’ to counter market failures is warranted. |
| Subject | Consent, EU privacy law, EU-GDPR, behavioral law and economics, big data, constitutional law, game theory, libertarian paternalism, monetizing personal data, nudging |
| DDC | 340 |
| Rights | DPPL |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:0009-29-45293 |
