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Tim Zander, Anne Steinbrück, Pascal Birnstill, Game-theoretical Model on the GDPR - Market for Lemons?, 10 (2019) JIPITEC 200 para 1.
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%0 Journal Article %T Game-theoretical Model on the GDPR - Market for Lemons? %A Zander, Tim %A Steinbrück, Anne %A Birnstill, Pascal %J JIPITEC %D 2019 %V 10 %N 2 %@ 2190-3387 %F zander2019 %X In order to evaluate the regulatory effects of the GDPR on the institution of privacy as a public good, a data protection law and economical perspective should be applied. Conveying an economic point of view on the GDPR, we include a game-theoretical model on the rights and duties arising out of the GDPR in order to clarify the possible game-theoretical strategies and discuss the compensatory mechanisms for the problem of asymmetric information between the data controller and the data subject. Furthermore, we point out the concepts of control and the legal construction of “data ownership” as an unsatisfying concept. The fact that services within the scope of the GDPR can rewrite their privacy policies and afterwards request the users’ consent or otherwise lock them out of the service causes undue pressure on the data subject. The recent decision of the Federal Cartel Office of Germany disputed this behaviour and imposed far-reaching restrictions on Facebook. Thus, elements of the GDPR have begun to fall within the remit of competition law and the question of effective regulatory compensation regarding the economic effects in privacy should be addressed. In general, the measurement of privacy risks seems to be the first reasonable step towards empowering actors to make effective decisions. %L 340 %K EU-Privacy %K GDPR %K adverse selection %K game-theory %K information asymmetry %K justification of data processing %K lock-in effect %K network effect %U http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-49236 %P 200-208Download
Bibtex
@Article{zander2019,
author = "Zander, Tim
and Steinbr{\"u}ck, Anne
and Birnstill, Pascal",
title = "Game-theoretical Model on the GDPR - Market for Lemons?",
journal = "JIPITEC",
year = "2019",
volume = "10",
number = "2",
pages = "200--208",
keywords = "EU-Privacy; GDPR; adverse selection; game-theory; information asymmetry; justification of data processing; lock-in effect; network effect",
abstract = "In order to evaluate the regulatory effects of the GDPR on the institution of privacy as a public good, a data protection law and economical perspective should be applied. Conveying an economic point of view on the GDPR, we include a game-theoretical model on the rights and duties arising out of the GDPR in order to clarify the possible game-theoretical strategies and discuss the compensatory mechanisms for the problem of asymmetric information between the data controller and the data subject. Furthermore, we point out the concepts of control and the legal construction of ``data ownership'' as an unsatisfying concept. The fact that services within the scope of the GDPR can rewrite their privacy policies and afterwards request the users' consent or otherwise lock them out of the service causes undue pressure on the data subject. The recent decision of the Federal Cartel Office of Germany disputed this behaviour and imposed far-reaching restrictions on Facebook. Thus, elements of the GDPR have begun to fall within the remit of competition law and the question of effective regulatory compensation regarding the economic effects in privacy should be addressed. In general, the measurement of privacy risks seems to be the first reasonable step towards empowering actors to make effective decisions.",
issn = "2190-3387",
url = "http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-49236"
}
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TY - JOUR AU - Zander, Tim AU - Steinbrück, Anne AU - Birnstill, Pascal PY - 2019 DA - 2019// TI - Game-theoretical Model on the GDPR - Market for Lemons? JO - JIPITEC SP - 200 EP - 208 VL - 10 IS - 2 KW - EU-Privacy KW - GDPR KW - adverse selection KW - game-theory KW - information asymmetry KW - justification of data processing KW - lock-in effect KW - network effect AB - In order to evaluate the regulatory effects of the GDPR on the institution of privacy as a public good, a data protection law and economical perspective should be applied. Conveying an economic point of view on the GDPR, we include a game-theoretical model on the rights and duties arising out of the GDPR in order to clarify the possible game-theoretical strategies and discuss the compensatory mechanisms for the problem of asymmetric information between the data controller and the data subject. Furthermore, we point out the concepts of control and the legal construction of “data ownership” as an unsatisfying concept. The fact that services within the scope of the GDPR can rewrite their privacy policies and afterwards request the users’ consent or otherwise lock them out of the service causes undue pressure on the data subject. The recent decision of the Federal Cartel Office of Germany disputed this behaviour and imposed far-reaching restrictions on Facebook. Thus, elements of the GDPR have begun to fall within the remit of competition law and the question of effective regulatory compensation regarding the economic effects in privacy should be addressed. In general, the measurement of privacy risks seems to be the first reasonable step towards empowering actors to make effective decisions. SN - 2190-3387 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-49236 ID - zander2019 ER -Download
Wordbib
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ISI
PT Journal AU Zander, T Steinbrück, A Birnstill, P TI Game-theoretical Model on the GDPR - Market for Lemons? SO JIPITEC PY 2019 BP 200 EP 208 VL 10 IS 2 DE EU-Privacy; GDPR; adverse selection; game-theory; information asymmetry; justification of data processing; lock-in effect; network effect AB In order to evaluate the regulatory effects of the GDPR on the institution of privacy as a public good, a data protection law and economical perspective should be applied. Conveying an economic point of view on the GDPR, we include a game-theoretical model on the rights and duties arising out of the GDPR in order to clarify the possible game-theoretical strategies and discuss the compensatory mechanisms for the problem of asymmetric information between the data controller and the data subject. Furthermore, we point out the concepts of control and the legal construction of “data ownership” as an unsatisfying concept. The fact that services within the scope of the GDPR can rewrite their privacy policies and afterwards request the users’ consent or otherwise lock them out of the service causes undue pressure on the data subject. The recent decision of the Federal Cartel Office of Germany disputed this behaviour and imposed far-reaching restrictions on Facebook. Thus, elements of the GDPR have begun to fall within the remit of competition law and the question of effective regulatory compensation regarding the economic effects in privacy should be addressed. In general, the measurement of privacy risks seems to be the first reasonable step towards empowering actors to make effective decisions. ERDownload
Mods
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<abstract>In order to evaluate the regulatory effects of the GDPR on the institution of privacy as a public good, a data protection law and economical perspective should be applied. Conveying an economic point of view on the GDPR, we include a game-theoretical model on the rights and duties arising out of the GDPR in order to clarify the possible game-theoretical strategies and discuss the compensatory mechanisms for the problem of asymmetric information between the data controller and the data subject. Furthermore, we point out the concepts of control and the legal construction of “data ownership” as an unsatisfying concept. The fact that services within the scope of the GDPR can rewrite their privacy policies and afterwards request the users’ consent or otherwise lock them out of the service causes undue pressure on the data subject. The recent decision of the Federal Cartel Office of Germany disputed this behaviour and imposed far-reaching restrictions on Facebook. Thus, elements of the GDPR have begun to fall within the remit of competition law and the question of effective regulatory compensation regarding the economic effects in privacy should be addressed. In general, the measurement of privacy risks seems to be the first reasonable step towards empowering actors to make effective decisions.</abstract>
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Full Metadata
| Bibliographic Citation | Journal of intellectual property, information technology and electronic commerce law 10 (2019) 2 |
|---|---|
| Title |
Game-theoretical Model on the GDPR - Market for Lemons? (eng) |
| Author | Tim Zander, Anne Steinbrück, Pascal Birnstill |
| Language | eng |
| Abstract | In order to evaluate the regulatory effects of the GDPR on the institution of privacy as a public good, a data protection law and economical perspective should be applied. Conveying an economic point of view on the GDPR, we include a game-theoretical model on the rights and duties arising out of the GDPR in order to clarify the possible game-theoretical strategies and discuss the compensatory mechanisms for the problem of asymmetric information between the data controller and the data subject. Furthermore, we point out the concepts of control and the legal construction of “data ownership” as an unsatisfying concept. The fact that services within the scope of the GDPR can rewrite their privacy policies and afterwards request the users’ consent or otherwise lock them out of the service causes undue pressure on the data subject. The recent decision of the Federal Cartel Office of Germany disputed this behaviour and imposed far-reaching restrictions on Facebook. Thus, elements of the GDPR have begun to fall within the remit of competition law and the question of effective regulatory compensation regarding the economic effects in privacy should be addressed. In general, the measurement of privacy risks seems to be the first reasonable step towards empowering actors to make effective decisions. |
| Subject | EU-Privacy, GDPR, adverse selection, game-theory, information asymmetry, justification of data processing, lock-in effect, network effect |
| DDC | 340 |
| Rights | DPPL |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:0009-29-49236 |
