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Mathew Heim, Igor Nikolic, A FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms, 10 (2019) JIPITEC 38 para 1.
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%0 Journal Article %T A FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms %A Heim, Mathew %A Nikolic, Igor %J JIPITEC %D 2019 %V 10 %N 1 %@ 2190-3387 %F heim2019 %X Dominant digital platforms are under increased scrutiny by regulators around the world, notably competition authorities. Much of the discussion focuses on market access and contestability. However, many doubt whether traditional competition law enforcement can, by itself, be an adequate solution to the challenges posed by dominant digital platforms. Instead, a broader regulatory solution could be devised to ensure effective competition and to provide access to critical platforms or access to data. On the premises that regulation is warranted, this paper considers whether a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime could be a solution to ensure effective competition, while maintaining the incentives of dominant platforms to innovate. The paper shows that, beyond the application of FRAND in the competition law context, the European Union institutions have consistently used the FRAND regime to ensure access to critical infrastructure or inputs. The FRAND regime has been applied in EU legislation such as standardisation, chemicals, electronic communications framework, public sector information, research framework, vehicles emissions, payment services, credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. It has proved itself to be a flexible and pragmatic tool, able to apply to different market dynamics and bottlenecks. Drawing out the common elements of this European FRAND access regime, the paper considers how it could be applied as a regulatory solution for dominant digital platforms. %L 340 %K Access %K FRAND %K competition law %K data sharing %K digital platforms %K digital single market %K interoperability %U http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-48836 %P 38-55Download
Bibtex
@Article{heim2019,
author = "Heim, Mathew
and Nikolic, Igor",
title = "A FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms",
journal = "JIPITEC",
year = "2019",
volume = "10",
number = "1",
pages = "38--55",
keywords = "Access; FRAND; competition law; data sharing; digital platforms; digital single market; interoperability",
abstract = "Dominant digital platforms are under increased scrutiny by regulators around the world, notably competition authorities. Much of the discussion focuses on market access and contestability. However, many doubt whether traditional competition law enforcement can, by itself, be an adequate solution to the challenges posed by dominant digital platforms. Instead, a broader regulatory solution could be devised to ensure effective competition and to provide access to critical platforms or access to data. On the premises that regulation is warranted, this paper considers whether a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime could be a solution to ensure effective competition, while maintaining the incentives of dominant platforms to innovate. The paper shows that, beyond the application of FRAND in the competition law context, the European Union institutions have consistently used the FRAND regime to ensure access to critical infrastructure or inputs. The FRAND regime has been applied in EU legislation such as standardisation, chemicals, electronic communications framework, public sector information, research framework, vehicles emissions, payment services, credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. It has proved itself to be a flexible and pragmatic tool, able to apply to different market dynamics and bottlenecks. Drawing out the common elements of this European FRAND access regime, the paper considers how it could be applied as a regulatory solution for dominant digital platforms.",
issn = "2190-3387",
url = "http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-48836"
}
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TY - JOUR AU - Heim, Mathew AU - Nikolic, Igor PY - 2019 DA - 2019// TI - A FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms JO - JIPITEC SP - 38 EP - 55 VL - 10 IS - 1 KW - Access KW - FRAND KW - competition law KW - data sharing KW - digital platforms KW - digital single market KW - interoperability AB - Dominant digital platforms are under increased scrutiny by regulators around the world, notably competition authorities. Much of the discussion focuses on market access and contestability. However, many doubt whether traditional competition law enforcement can, by itself, be an adequate solution to the challenges posed by dominant digital platforms. Instead, a broader regulatory solution could be devised to ensure effective competition and to provide access to critical platforms or access to data. On the premises that regulation is warranted, this paper considers whether a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime could be a solution to ensure effective competition, while maintaining the incentives of dominant platforms to innovate. The paper shows that, beyond the application of FRAND in the competition law context, the European Union institutions have consistently used the FRAND regime to ensure access to critical infrastructure or inputs. The FRAND regime has been applied in EU legislation such as standardisation, chemicals, electronic communications framework, public sector information, research framework, vehicles emissions, payment services, credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. It has proved itself to be a flexible and pragmatic tool, able to apply to different market dynamics and bottlenecks. Drawing out the common elements of this European FRAND access regime, the paper considers how it could be applied as a regulatory solution for dominant digital platforms. SN - 2190-3387 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-48836 ID - heim2019 ER -Download
Wordbib
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ISI
PT Journal AU Heim, M Nikolic, I TI A FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms SO JIPITEC PY 2019 BP 38 EP 55 VL 10 IS 1 DE Access; FRAND; competition law; data sharing; digital platforms; digital single market; interoperability AB Dominant digital platforms are under increased scrutiny by regulators around the world, notably competition authorities. Much of the discussion focuses on market access and contestability. However, many doubt whether traditional competition law enforcement can, by itself, be an adequate solution to the challenges posed by dominant digital platforms. Instead, a broader regulatory solution could be devised to ensure effective competition and to provide access to critical platforms or access to data. On the premises that regulation is warranted, this paper considers whether a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime could be a solution to ensure effective competition, while maintaining the incentives of dominant platforms to innovate. The paper shows that, beyond the application of FRAND in the competition law context, the European Union institutions have consistently used the FRAND regime to ensure access to critical infrastructure or inputs. The FRAND regime has been applied in EU legislation such as standardisation, chemicals, electronic communications framework, public sector information, research framework, vehicles emissions, payment services, credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. It has proved itself to be a flexible and pragmatic tool, able to apply to different market dynamics and bottlenecks. Drawing out the common elements of this European FRAND access regime, the paper considers how it could be applied as a regulatory solution for dominant digital platforms. ERDownload
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Full Metadata
| Bibliographic Citation | Journal of intellectual property, information technology and electronic commerce law 10 (2019) 1 |
|---|---|
| Title |
A FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms (eng) |
| Author | Mathew Heim, Igor Nikolic |
| Language | eng |
| Abstract | Dominant digital platforms are under increased scrutiny by regulators around the world, notably competition authorities. Much of the discussion focuses on market access and contestability. However, many doubt whether traditional competition law enforcement can, by itself, be an adequate solution to the challenges posed by dominant digital platforms. Instead, a broader regulatory solution could be devised to ensure effective competition and to provide access to critical platforms or access to data. On the premises that regulation is warranted, this paper considers whether a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime could be a solution to ensure effective competition, while maintaining the incentives of dominant platforms to innovate. The paper shows that, beyond the application of FRAND in the competition law context, the European Union institutions have consistently used the FRAND regime to ensure access to critical infrastructure or inputs. The FRAND regime has been applied in EU legislation such as standardisation, chemicals, electronic communications framework, public sector information, research framework, vehicles emissions, payment services, credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. It has proved itself to be a flexible and pragmatic tool, able to apply to different market dynamics and bottlenecks. Drawing out the common elements of this European FRAND access regime, the paper considers how it could be applied as a regulatory solution for dominant digital platforms. |
| Subject | Access, FRAND, competition law, data sharing, digital platforms, digital single market, interoperability |
| DDC | 340 |
| Rights | DPPL |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:0009-29-48836 |
