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Mathew Heim, Igor Nikolic, A FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms, 10 (2019) JIPITEC 38 para 1.

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%0 Journal Article
%T A FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms
%A Heim, Mathew
%A Nikolic, Igor
%J JIPITEC
%D 2019
%V 10
%N 1
%@ 2190-3387
%F heim2019
%X Dominant digital platforms are under increased scrutiny by regulators around the world, notably competition authorities. Much of the discussion focuses on market access and contestability. However, many doubt whether traditional competition law enforcement can, by itself, be an adequate solution to the challenges posed by dominant digital platforms. Instead, a broader regulatory solution could be devised to ensure effective competition and to provide access to critical platforms or access to data. On the premises that regulation is warranted, this paper considers whether a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime could be a solution to ensure effective competition, while maintaining the incentives of dominant platforms to innovate. The paper shows that, beyond the application of FRAND in the competition law context, the European Union institutions have consistently used the FRAND regime to ensure access to critical infrastructure or inputs. The FRAND regime has been applied in EU legislation such as standardisation, chemicals, electronic communications framework, public sector information, research framework, vehicles emissions, payment services, credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. It has proved itself to be a flexible and pragmatic tool, able to apply to different market dynamics and bottlenecks. Drawing out the common elements of this European FRAND access regime, the paper considers how it could be applied as a regulatory solution for dominant digital platforms.
%L 340
%K Access
%K FRAND
%K competition law
%K data sharing
%K digital platforms
%K digital single market
%K interoperability
%U http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-48836
%P 38-55

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Bibtex

@Article{heim2019,
  author = 	"Heim, Mathew
		and Nikolic, Igor",
  title = 	"A FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms",
  journal = 	"JIPITEC",
  year = 	"2019",
  volume = 	"10",
  number = 	"1",
  pages = 	"38--55",
  keywords = 	"Access; FRAND; competition law; data sharing; digital platforms; digital single market; interoperability",
  abstract = 	"Dominant digital platforms are under increased scrutiny by regulators around the world, notably competition authorities. Much of the discussion focuses on market access and contestability. However, many doubt whether traditional competition law enforcement can, by itself, be an adequate solution to the challenges posed by dominant digital platforms. Instead, a broader regulatory solution could be devised to ensure effective competition and to provide access to critical platforms or access to data. On the premises that regulation is warranted, this paper considers whether a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime could be a solution to ensure effective competition, while maintaining the incentives of dominant platforms to innovate. The paper shows that, beyond the application of FRAND in the competition law context, the European Union institutions have consistently used the FRAND regime to ensure access to critical infrastructure or inputs. The FRAND regime has been applied in EU legislation such as standardisation, chemicals, electronic communications framework, public sector information, research framework, vehicles emissions, payment services, credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. It has proved itself to be a flexible and pragmatic tool, able to apply to different market dynamics and bottlenecks. Drawing out the common elements of this European FRAND access regime, the paper considers how it could be applied as a regulatory solution for dominant digital platforms.",
  issn = 	"2190-3387",
  url = 	"http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-48836"
}

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RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Heim, Mathew
AU  - Nikolic, Igor
PY  - 2019
DA  - 2019//
TI  - A FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms
JO  - JIPITEC
SP  - 38
EP  - 55
VL  - 10
IS  - 1
KW  - Access
KW  - FRAND
KW  - competition law
KW  - data sharing
KW  - digital platforms
KW  - digital single market
KW  - interoperability
AB  - Dominant digital platforms are under increased scrutiny by regulators around the world, notably competition authorities. Much of the discussion focuses on market access and contestability. However, many doubt whether traditional competition law enforcement can, by itself, be an adequate solution to the challenges posed by dominant digital platforms. Instead, a broader regulatory solution could be devised to ensure effective competition and to provide access to critical platforms or access to data. On the premises that regulation is warranted, this paper considers whether a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime could be a solution to ensure effective competition, while maintaining the incentives of dominant platforms to innovate. The paper shows that, beyond the application of FRAND in the competition law context, the European Union institutions have consistently used the FRAND regime to ensure access to critical infrastructure or inputs. The FRAND regime has been applied in EU legislation such as standardisation, chemicals, electronic communications framework, public sector information, research framework, vehicles emissions, payment services, credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. It has proved itself to be a flexible and pragmatic tool, able to apply to different market dynamics and bottlenecks. Drawing out the common elements of this European FRAND access regime, the paper considers how it could be applied as a regulatory solution for dominant digital platforms.
SN  - 2190-3387
UR  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-48836
ID  - heim2019
ER  - 
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Wordbib

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<b:Comments>Dominant digital platforms are under increased scrutiny by regulators around the world, notably competition authorities. Much of the discussion focuses on market access and contestability. However, many doubt whether traditional competition law enforcement can, by itself, be an adequate solution to the challenges posed by dominant digital platforms. Instead, a broader regulatory solution could be devised to ensure effective competition and to provide access to critical platforms or access to data. On the premises that regulation is warranted, this paper considers whether a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime could be a solution to ensure effective competition, while maintaining the incentives of dominant platforms to innovate. The paper shows that, beyond the application of FRAND in the competition law context, the European Union institutions have consistently used the FRAND regime to ensure access to critical infrastructure or inputs. The FRAND regime has been applied in EU legislation such as standardisation, chemicals, electronic communications framework, public sector information, research framework, vehicles emissions, payment services, credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. It has proved itself to be a flexible and pragmatic tool, able to apply to different market dynamics and bottlenecks. Drawing out the common elements of this European FRAND access regime, the paper considers how it could be applied as a regulatory solution for dominant digital platforms.</b:Comments>
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ISI

PT Journal
AU Heim, M
   Nikolic, I
TI A FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms
SO JIPITEC
PY 2019
BP 38
EP 55
VL 10
IS 1
DE Access; FRAND; competition law; data sharing; digital platforms; digital single market; interoperability
AB Dominant digital platforms are under increased scrutiny by regulators around the world, notably competition authorities. Much of the discussion focuses on market access and contestability. However, many doubt whether traditional competition law enforcement can, by itself, be an adequate solution to the challenges posed by dominant digital platforms. Instead, a broader regulatory solution could be devised to ensure effective competition and to provide access to critical platforms or access to data. On the premises that regulation is warranted, this paper considers whether a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime could be a solution to ensure effective competition, while maintaining the incentives of dominant platforms to innovate. The paper shows that, beyond the application of FRAND in the competition law context, the European Union institutions have consistently used the FRAND regime to ensure access to critical infrastructure or inputs. The FRAND regime has been applied in EU legislation such as standardisation, chemicals, electronic communications framework, public sector information, research framework, vehicles emissions, payment services, credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. It has proved itself to be a flexible and pragmatic tool, able to apply to different market dynamics and bottlenecks. Drawing out the common elements of this European FRAND access regime, the paper considers how it could be applied as a regulatory solution for dominant digital platforms.
ER

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Mods

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  <titleInfo>
    <title>A FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms</title>
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  <name type="personal">
    <namePart type="family">Heim</namePart>
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  <name type="personal">
    <namePart type="family">Nikolic</namePart>
    <namePart type="given">Igor</namePart>
  </name>
  <abstract>Dominant digital platforms are under increased scrutiny by regulators around the world, notably competition authorities. Much of the discussion focuses on market access and contestability. However, many doubt whether traditional competition law enforcement can, by itself, be an adequate solution to the challenges posed by dominant digital platforms. Instead, a broader regulatory solution could be devised to ensure effective competition and to provide access to critical platforms or access to data. On the premises that regulation is warranted, this paper considers whether a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime could be a solution to ensure effective competition, while maintaining the incentives of dominant platforms to innovate. The paper shows that, beyond the application of FRAND in the competition law context, the European Union institutions have consistently used the FRAND regime to ensure access to critical infrastructure or inputs. The FRAND regime has been applied in EU legislation such as standardisation, chemicals, electronic communications framework, public sector information, research framework, vehicles emissions, payment services, credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. It has proved itself to be a flexible and pragmatic tool, able to apply to different market dynamics and bottlenecks. Drawing out the common elements of this European FRAND access regime, the paper considers how it could be applied as a regulatory solution for dominant digital platforms.</abstract>
  <subject>
    <topic>Access</topic>
    <topic>FRAND</topic>
    <topic>competition law</topic>
    <topic>data sharing</topic>
    <topic>digital platforms</topic>
    <topic>digital single market</topic>
    <topic>interoperability</topic>
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Full Metadata

JIPITEC – Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law
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