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Amélie Pia Heldt, Upload-Filters: Bypassing Classical Concepts of Censorship?, 10 (2019) JIPITEC 56 para 1.

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%0 Journal Article
%T Upload-Filters: Bypassing Classical Concepts of Censorship?
%A Heldt, Amélie Pia
%J JIPITEC
%D 2019
%V 10
%N 1
%@ 2190-3387
%F heldt2019
%X Protecting human rights in the context of automated decision-making might not be limited to the relationship between intermediaries and their users. In fact, in order to adequately address human rights issues vis-à-vis social media platforms, we need to include the state as an actor too. In the German and European human rights frameworks, fundamental rights are in principle only applicable vertically, that is, between the state and the citizen. Where does that leave the right of freedom of expression when user-generated content is deleted by intermediaries on the basis of an agreement with a public authority? We must address this question in light of the use of artificial intelligence to moderate online speech and its (until now lacking) regulatory framework. When states create incentives for private actors to delete user-content pro-actively, is it still accurate to solely examine the relationship between platforms and users? Are we facing an expansion of collateral censorship? Is the usage of soft law instruments, such as codes of conduct, enhancing the protection of third parties or is it rather an opaque instrument that tends to be conflated with policy laundering? This paper aims to analyse the different layers of the usage of artificial intelligence by platforms, when it is triggered by a non-regulatory mode of governance. In light of the ongoing struggle in content moderation to balance between freedom of speech and other legal interests, it is necessary to analyse whether or not intelligent technologies could meet the requirements of freedom of speech and information to a sufficient degree.
%L 340
%K Freedom of expression
%K censorship
%K democratic legitimation
%K prior restraint
%K upload-filters
%U http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-48777
%P 56-64

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Bibtex

@Article{heldt2019,
  author = 	"Heldt, Am{\'e}lie Pia",
  title = 	"Upload-Filters: Bypassing Classical Concepts of Censorship?",
  journal = 	"JIPITEC",
  year = 	"2019",
  volume = 	"10",
  number = 	"1",
  pages = 	"56--64",
  keywords = 	"Freedom of expression; censorship; democratic legitimation; prior restraint; upload-filters",
  abstract = 	"Protecting human rights in the context of automated decision-making might not be limited to the relationship between intermediaries and their users. In fact, in order to adequately address human rights issues vis-{\`a}-vis social media platforms, we need to include the state as an actor too. In the German and European human rights frameworks, fundamental rights are in principle only applicable vertically, that is, between the state and the citizen. Where does that leave the right of freedom of expression when user-generated content is deleted by intermediaries on the basis of an agreement with a public authority? We must address this question in light of the use of artificial intelligence to moderate online speech and its (until now lacking) regulatory framework. When states create incentives for private actors to delete user-content pro-actively, is it still accurate to solely examine the relationship between platforms and users? Are we facing an expansion of collateral censorship? Is the usage of soft law instruments, such as codes of conduct, enhancing the protection of third parties or is it rather an opaque instrument that tends to be conflated with policy laundering? This paper aims to analyse the different layers of the usage of artificial intelligence by platforms, when it is triggered by a non-regulatory mode of governance. In light of the ongoing struggle in content moderation to balance between freedom of speech and other legal interests, it is necessary to analyse whether or not intelligent technologies could meet the requirements of freedom of speech and information to a sufficient degree.",
  issn = 	"2190-3387",
  url = 	"http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-48777"
}

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RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Heldt, Amélie Pia
PY  - 2019
DA  - 2019//
TI  - Upload-Filters: Bypassing Classical Concepts of Censorship?
JO  - JIPITEC
SP  - 56
EP  - 64
VL  - 10
IS  - 1
KW  - Freedom of expression
KW  - censorship
KW  - democratic legitimation
KW  - prior restraint
KW  - upload-filters
AB  - Protecting human rights in the context of automated decision-making might not be limited to the relationship between intermediaries and their users. In fact, in order to adequately address human rights issues vis-à-vis social media platforms, we need to include the state as an actor too. In the German and European human rights frameworks, fundamental rights are in principle only applicable vertically, that is, between the state and the citizen. Where does that leave the right of freedom of expression when user-generated content is deleted by intermediaries on the basis of an agreement with a public authority? We must address this question in light of the use of artificial intelligence to moderate online speech and its (until now lacking) regulatory framework. When states create incentives for private actors to delete user-content pro-actively, is it still accurate to solely examine the relationship between platforms and users? Are we facing an expansion of collateral censorship? Is the usage of soft law instruments, such as codes of conduct, enhancing the protection of third parties or is it rather an opaque instrument that tends to be conflated with policy laundering? This paper aims to analyse the different layers of the usage of artificial intelligence by platforms, when it is triggered by a non-regulatory mode of governance. In light of the ongoing struggle in content moderation to balance between freedom of speech and other legal interests, it is necessary to analyse whether or not intelligent technologies could meet the requirements of freedom of speech and information to a sufficient degree.
SN  - 2190-3387
UR  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-48777
ID  - heldt2019
ER  - 
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Wordbib

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ISI

PT Journal
AU Heldt, A
TI Upload-Filters: Bypassing Classical Concepts of Censorship?
SO JIPITEC
PY 2019
BP 56
EP 64
VL 10
IS 1
DE Freedom of expression; censorship; democratic legitimation; prior restraint; upload-filters
AB Protecting human rights in the context of automated decision-making might not be limited to the relationship between intermediaries and their users. In fact, in order to adequately address human rights issues vis-à-vis social media platforms, we need to include the state as an actor too. In the German and European human rights frameworks, fundamental rights are in principle only applicable vertically, that is, between the state and the citizen. Where does that leave the right of freedom of expression when user-generated content is deleted by intermediaries on the basis of an agreement with a public authority? We must address this question in light of the use of artificial intelligence to moderate online speech and its (until now lacking) regulatory framework. When states create incentives for private actors to delete user-content pro-actively, is it still accurate to solely examine the relationship between platforms and users? Are we facing an expansion of collateral censorship? Is the usage of soft law instruments, such as codes of conduct, enhancing the protection of third parties or is it rather an opaque instrument that tends to be conflated with policy laundering? This paper aims to analyse the different layers of the usage of artificial intelligence by platforms, when it is triggered by a non-regulatory mode of governance. In light of the ongoing struggle in content moderation to balance between freedom of speech and other legal interests, it is necessary to analyse whether or not intelligent technologies could meet the requirements of freedom of speech and information to a sufficient degree.
ER

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Mods

<mods>
  <titleInfo>
    <title>Upload-Filters: Bypassing Classical Concepts of Censorship?</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart type="family">Heldt</namePart>
    <namePart type="given">Amélie Pia</namePart>
  </name>
  <abstract>Protecting human rights in the context of automated decision-making might not be limited to the relationship between intermediaries and their users. In fact, in order to adequately address human rights issues vis-à-vis social media platforms, we need to include the state as an actor too. In the German and European human rights frameworks, fundamental rights are in principle only applicable vertically, that is, between the state and the citizen. Where does that leave the right of freedom of expression when user-generated content is deleted by intermediaries on the basis of an agreement with a public authority? We must address this question in light of the use of artificial intelligence to moderate online speech and its (until now lacking) regulatory framework. When states create incentives for private actors to delete user-content pro-actively, is it still accurate to solely examine the relationship between platforms and users? Are we facing an expansion of collateral censorship? Is the usage of soft law instruments, such as codes of conduct, enhancing the protection of third parties or is it rather an opaque instrument that tends to be conflated with policy laundering? This paper aims to analyse the different layers of the usage of artificial intelligence by platforms, when it is triggered by a non-regulatory mode of governance. In light of the ongoing struggle in content moderation to balance between freedom of speech and other legal interests, it is necessary to analyse whether or not intelligent technologies could meet the requirements of freedom of speech and information to a sufficient degree.</abstract>
  <subject>
    <topic>Freedom of expression</topic>
    <topic>censorship</topic>
    <topic>democratic legitimation</topic>
    <topic>prior restraint</topic>
    <topic>upload-filters</topic>
  </subject>
  <classification authority="ddc">340</classification>
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    <genre>academic journal</genre>
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      <detail type="volume">
        <number>10</number>
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      <detail type="issue">
        <number>1</number>
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      <date>2019</date>
      <extent unit="page">
        <start>56</start>
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  <identifier type="citekey">heldt2019</identifier>
</mods>
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JIPITEC – Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law
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